About

Alireza Mohammadi Sepahvand

I received my PhD in Economics from Monash University. I also hold an MSc in Economics and a BSc in Applied Mathematics from Sharif University of Technology. My research interests are economic theory, political economy, network economics, public economics. I am particularly interested in political fragility, networks, inequality, and social movements in settings with weak institutions.

Alongside my academic research, I work part-time as an industrial economist at Navim Pouya Company. I study market structure, pricing, and competition and assess how economic policy affects firms’ costs and competitiveness. I prepare forecasts, scenario analyses, and briefings for senior management and the board to inform financial planning, investment, and trade decisions.

I have lectured in Principles of Economics and Game Theory and served as a teaching assistant for graduate and undergraduate courses, including Microeconomics, Financial Econometrics, Advanced Mathematical Economics, International Economics, Statistics, Linear Algebra, and Graph Theory.

ReSEARCH

Working Papers

Plundering Coalition

with Weijia Li

We develop a model of coalitions that extract resources from outsiders. Players are endowed with power and resources. The ruling coalition distributes the resources it extracts among its members and protects their own resources. We study the resilience of the equilibrium ruling coalition to exogenous shocks to the power and resources of insiders and outsiders and to the intensity of plundering. Arranging members into a hierarchy weakly increases resilience to shocks to outsiders’ power and resources. Members within each rank have equal power and resources, and higher ranks have weakly more of both, with at least one strict inequality. The gain is strict when a relevant insider subcoalition is locally decisive. A sufficiently low uniform upper bound on the marginal return to power guarantees local decisiveness. When the marginal return to power is uniformly high, external resilience depends only on the ruling coalition’s aggregate power and resources. We interpret low and high marginal returns to power as reflecting weak and strong property rights protection, respectively. We also identify a condition under which internal and external resilience trade off.

Timing and Targeting in Network Games

with Arthur Campbell and Yves Zenou

We study how the timing of intervention affects optimal targeting in network games with strategic complementarities and incomplete information. Individuals differ in their number of connections and choose effort before knowing who their neighbours will be. A social planner allocates a fixed enforcement budget across degree classes to minimise total surviving activity. When enforcement and effort are chosen simultaneously, the unique equilibrium targets the most connected individuals and equalises effort across targeted classes, without fully eliminating any class. A planner who commits before individuals choose effort also anticipates how intervention lowers effort through network spillovers. These indirect effects, captured by a measure of network amplification, can make it optimal to concentrate enforcement on highly connected individuals. When the weight of a degree class in individuals’ beliefs about their neighbours, relative to its population share, weakly increases with degree, network amplification is stronger for more connected individuals. Under this condition, if simultaneous intervention targets at least two classes, shifting enforcement towards the more connected class strictly reduces total surviving activity. We identify the exact budget threshold above which commitment strictly improves on simultaneous intervention.

A Centered Index of Spatial Concentration: Expected Influence Approach and Application to Population and Capital Cities

with Filipe R. Campante and Quoc-Anh Do

We construct a general axiomatic approach to measuring spatial concentration around a center or capital point of interest. Building on expected utility theory, we propose a basic axiom of independence (subgroup consistency), and show that it implies an expected influence representation of the concentration order. We prove that two additional axioms (monotonicity and rank invariance) imply that the associated influence function is a decreasing isoelastic function of the distance to the capital. We apply our index to measure the concentration of population around capital cities, show its advantages over alternative measures, and explore its correlations with many variables of interest.

Work in Progress

  • Correlates of Democratic-Leaning Polling Error in U.S. Presidential Elections (2004–2024), with Ehsan Habibpour
  • Optimal Subsidies for Qualifying Submissions
  • Enforcement and Concealment in Networks
  • Family Work and Labor-Market Adjustment: Evidence from Afghan Migration to Iran, With GholamReza Keshavarz Haddad

contact

amohamma@ed.ac.uk

Room 4.5, 31 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh EH8 9NA, United Kingdom

Copyright © 2026 Alireza Mohammadi Sepahvand.